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does allow suppliers, in certain cases, to rationalize their operations through
the use of "specialization agreements" in which the contracting parties
reciprocally undertake to abandon the production or supply of an article
or service, so long as the Tribunal concludes that the agreement will result
in gains of efficiency that will compensate for any anticompetitive effects.
The Director and the Competition Tribunal represent a much more
pervasive governmental influence than has ever been experienced under
Canada's prior competition legislation. Nevertheless, the existence of a
forum in which business arrangements that are subject to government
notification and review can be the subject of negotiation rather than crim-
inal prosecution may have significant advantages for business.
Federal Republic of Germany*
The regulation of the insurance industry is presently a hot issue in the
European Economic Community. The question is now before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice; the outcome will be crucial for the further devel-
opment of the law governing the state supervision over the industry.
1. The Background
In Continental Europe it is a strong tradition that the control of the
insurance industry should not be left entirely to the forces of the market.
Insurance is regarded as a kind of bet on the future, as an invisible,
intangible good. The insurance contract is viewed as basically out of
balance with regard to the know-how of the contracting parties: the sit-
uation is often much worse than in horse trading; the policyholder fre-
quently is not able to know what he pays for.
Therefore the German law requires an initial authorization by a federal
agency for every insurance company. This requirement guarantees a pre-
ventive monitoring to ensure that the planned activity is in the interest
of policyholders and the general public. It provides for the financial sound-
ness of insurance companies, but it goes beyond that, including in par-
ticular the content of policy conditions. In addition, the insurers' condi-
tions have to be harmonized with each other.
*Prepared by Professor Dr. Bernhard Grossfeld, institut fur auskindisches und interna-
tionales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Westfilische Wilhelms-Universitdt, MOnster.
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II. The Attack
The attack on this traditional view draws its legal strength from certain
provisions of the EEC Treaty concerning the free supply of services. The
freedom to provide cross-frontier services is one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Common Market to be effected between the Member States.
In point is article 59, which says that "restrictions on freedom to provide
services within the Community shall be progressively abolished." Article
60 defines as "services" "activities of a commercial character." This
definition includes insurance services.
These articles are designed to eliminate all restrictions on freedom to
provide services. They have direct legal effects and confer private rights
that the national courts must protect. In the earlier years of the Com-
munity's existence little attention was paid to services in general, and
insurance in particular. In recent years, however, considerable efforts
have been made to conquer lost grounds.I
The longstanding, rather academic discussion about this freedom took
a more practical turn with the Schleicher case.2 Schleicher was an in-
surance broker in Bavaria. He sold indemnity insurance for stocks of fur
to a German client placed with a number of insurers in London. These
insurers did not hold an authorization by the German Federal Insurance
Supervising Agency to do business in Germany, nor did they have an
establishment in Germany. Schleicher was fined (§ 144a VAG) and lost in
court. He appealed to the court of last resort, the Berlin Court of Appeals
(Kammergericht).
The Court of Appeals upheld the fine and declared the German law to
be compatible with the European rules on free supply of services. The
court, therefore, refused to refer the case to the European Court of Justice
in order to receive a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty.
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty makes this action obligatory for courts of
last resort if the matter is controversial. The Court of Appeals, however,
had no doubts, nor did it see any controversy.
As a result, the Commission of the European Community (the executive
body) became involved. It launched an attack and took the Federal Re-
public of Germany before the European Court of Justice, arguing that
Germany was breaking its Treaty obligations to implement the free supply
of services. Such a procedure is provided for in article 169 of the EEC
Treaty "if the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to
fulfill an obligation under this Treaty."
1. Pool, Moves Towards a Common Market in Insurance, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 123
(1984).
2. KAMMERGERICHT, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 856 (1983).
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The Commission received support from England and The Netherlands;
the Federal Republic of Germany was joined by Belgium, Denmark, France,
Ireland, and Italy. Ironically, the adviser for the Commission is a German
law professor from Munich. 3
III. The Day in Court
What are the arguments for and against? They lead us right into the
problem of what insurance is.
The Commission draws its spirit largely from the famous Cassis de
Dijon case,4 dealing with the free exchange of goods. The facts of this
case are as follows: Cassis de Dijon is a well-known French fruit liquor.
German law, however, did not allow it to be sold in Germany because
Cassis de Dijon contains less than twenty-five percent of alcohol-the
minimum percentage for fruit liquor under German law. The Germans
argued that this minimum requirement was necessary for reasons of public
health and for the protection of the consumer against unfair competition
(with low grades of alcohol).
The European Court of Justice did not accept either of these arguments.
The Court saw no convincing reason for this restriction. It denied a com-
mon interest that could have priority over the principle of free exchange
of goods.
The decision of the European Court of Justice stands for the proposition
that as a general rule goods that have been produced and brought onto
the market in one Member State according to its law must be marketable
throughout the whole Community. That reasoning sounds good for the
Commission's position. The trouble is, however, that this decision, as
indicated, deals with the free movement of goods, not with the free supply
of services. The question is, therefore, whether there is a difference be-
tween goods and services-not only in fact but also in law.
The defenders of the traditional state supervision over the insurance
industry stress the differences. They emphasize the particular character
of insurance services as dealing with pure construction of the law. No
material substance is exchanged, there is nothing more than the exchange
of words to which a particular law lends a binding force with further-
reaching consequences. Whereas goods are material objects determined
by their physical characteristics, insurance services are entirely deter-
mined by rules of law, are mere speech acts.5 The law-and only the law-
3. See his former positions in Steindorff, Insurance and the Freedom to Provide Services,
14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 133 (1977).
4. EuGH (ECJ) 20. Feb. 1979 -Rewe Zentral AG- 120/78, Sig. 1979/699.
5. Grossfeld, Language and the Law, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1985).
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creates the product. This law is the law of the individual Member State.
Power of words-of national words-so far!
IV. Technicalities
1. Technically the discussion runs under the headline of "intrinsic lim-
itations" that stand for a rule of reason and a balancing of interests. The
idea is that the EEC Treaty forbids only those restrictions that seem
unjustifiable in an economic community. What is required is an evaluation
of the rule giving rise to the limitation. At stake is the necessity or rea-
sonableness of national rules for social protection. Only "unreasonable"
rules should be eliminated.
Under this concept, for instance, the European Court of Justice6 upheld
the national prohibition of advertisements by cable television. 7 In more
general terms, a regulation of a Member State is an intrinsic limitation if
it is necessary for the protection of the public, and if it cannot be replaced
by a less restrictive regulation. 8
2. The Commission is of the opinion that the German legislation does
not meet these standards. In the Commission's eyes Germany provides
an excessive supervision, a "maximum of supervision," even in fields
where the protection of the policyholder is not essential, e.g., insurance
of goods indicative of a high standard of living, and therefore lacking
social relevance.
3. Finally, there may be some limits to the power of the European Court
of Justice to integrate the Community. The Court's assumption of a power
to override national laws is not unchallenged. Whereas the highest German
court in administrative matters supports the superiority of the European
Court of Justice, 9 the highest German court in tax matters favors a more
limited view. 10 This latter court held that the Member States' sovereignty
is restricted only by the language of the EEC Treaty itself, not by an
interpretation by the European Court of Justice going beyond the wording
of a Treaty provision.
6. EuGH (ECJ) 18. Marz 1980 -Delbauve- 52/79, Sig. 1980/833; see also EuGH (ECJ) 17.
Dez. 1981 -Webb- 279/80, Sig. 1981/3305.
7. See Grossfeld & Ebke, Strukturprinzipien des Rundfunks und privatrechtil. Organisa-
tionsformen im EG-Bereich, in SATELLITENFERNSEHEN UND DEUTSCHES RUNDFUNKSYS-
TEM S.29 (H. Hubner u.a. (Hrsg.) 1983).
8. See EuGH (ECJ) 10. Feb. 1982 -SA Transporoute et travaux- 76/81, Sig. 1982/417; EuGH
(ECJ) 20. Feb. 1979 -Rewe Zentral AG- 120/78, Sig.1979/649.
9. BUNDESVERWA LTUNGSGERICHT, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 143 (1985).
10. BUNDESFINANZHOF, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 143, 383; see B. GROSSFELD, ZEISS IN FRANK-
REICH, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS S. 303 (1985).
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